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Navigating Between Extremes:
The Florida Supreme Court's Rulings on
the Admission of Similar Fact Evidence
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Dilemma
In Homer's Odyssey, the hero Odysseus learns that in order to
return to his homeland he must chart a course for his ship between two
mortal dangers.' One is a tentacled monster, Scylla, who will lash out
and devour the sailors if they come within reach.' The other, Charybdis,
is an irresistible maelstrom that will suck down the entire ship.3 There is
no good solution to this dilemma, and it has come down to us as the
classic example of a situation that, on the one hand, demands that we
choose and, on the other, proclaims outright that no matter which way
we choose someone will suffer.
Judges in Florida and elsewhere face such a dilemma whenever the
prosecution in a child sexual abuse case seeks to introduce into evidence
a defendant's prior similar acts. The defense may have taken the posi-
tion that the incident never took place at all, that the child complainant's
testimony is false. Should the prosecution be allowed to introduce evi-
dence of similar crimes committed by the defendant to show a possible
predisposition to commit the charged crime? Does evidence of prior
acts support an inference that a defendant is more likely to have commit-
ted a particular act? If the evidence is to be allowed for that purpose,
then how similar to the charged crime-and thus how relevant for prov-
ing some element of the case-must a defendant's prior crime be to
make its admission into evidence worth the risk of creating an unfair
advantage for the prosecution?
The danger of admitting prior act testimony is that it will prejudice
the jury. They may ignore the entirety of the evidence and convict based
only on the logic that since the defendant committed crimes in the past,
he has a propensity to commit such crimes and likely committed this one
as well. Perhaps they will even conclude that whether or not he commit-
1. HOMER, ODYSSEY 169-72 (T.E. Lawrence trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1932) (750-
700 B.C.) (Before departing the isle of kEaea upon his return from Hades, Circe informs Odysseus
of the dilemma he will encounter on his continued journey homeward).
2. Id. at 171.
3. Id. at 171-72.
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ted this particular crime, he has probably committed others for which he
deserves punishment but was not caught by the police. In either case,
the jury has chosen to convict the defendant based not solely on their
judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that on the facts presented as to the
particular incident he did indeed commit the alleged crime, but also in
part because he is a particular kind of person, a criminal.4 When such a
judgment occurs, the integrity of the entire judicial process is called into
question, since the jury did what the law itself prohibits. As Professor
Imwinkelried reminds us, "For over two centuries, American courts
have adhered to the tenet that a litigant may not introduce testimony
about a specific act by a person in order to establish the person's charac-
ter and then infer that on a particular occasion, the person acted consist-
ently with his or her character."5 In conformity with this principle and
with Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, section 90.404(1), Flor-
ida Statute, states, in pertinent part "Evidence of a person's character or
a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it
on a particular occasion."6
Still, there are opposing dangers. If the case simply comes down to
a question of a child's testimony against an adult's denial, how can the
prosecution fulfill its burden of proof? Or, should evidence that is rele-
vant to establishing an element of the crime or an issue in question be
excluded because admitting that evidence would mean telling the jury
about a prior act by the defendant that might prejudice them?7 The con-
sequence might well be the acquittal of a sexual predator who will con-
tinue to victimize those members of our society least able to defend
themselves.
B. Propensity Evidence
Propensity evidence has much to recommend it. It is, after all,
extremely logical. Many of our daily judgments about people are based
upon what we know of their past, so it could hardly be called unreasona-
ble, in an ordinary sense of the word, if a jury came to the conclusion
4. Indeed, one much-cited commentator begs the question entirely by stating, "As a practical
matter, innocent people don't have prior victims." David M. De La Paz, Sacrificing the Whole
Truth: Florida's Deteriorating Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence in Cases of Child Sexual
Abuse, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 449, 450 (1999).
5. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed
Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44
SYRACuSE L. REV. 1125 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
6. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(l) (2000).
7. The federal system contains a balancing test. "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 404.
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that evidence of an accused person having committed a prior crime
makes it more probable that he would commit other crimes as well.8
Therefore, propensity evidence is always logically relevant. In fact, it is
exactly the "common-sense" relevance of propensity evidence that has
traditionally made it inadmissible in American courts.9 What is to be
proved in a particular trial, of course, is that the particular defendant
committed this particular crime on this particular occasion. It is the
facts that shed light on this question, and only those facts, that are
legally relevant. Propensity evidence is likely to have such a highly
prejudicial effect on a jury because it causes them to turn away from the
actual question whether the accused committed this act and to focus
instead on who the defendant is. If the defendant has a propensity to
commit criminal acts, he is a criminal, and therefore if he is a criminal,
he must have committed this particular act. In this case the defendant, is
convicted not of the crime charged, but convicted of being a criminal. 10
8. One commentator has explained the distinction quite well:
I would not think of hiring a baby-sitter for my six- and eight-year-old daughters if I
knew that the sitter had recently been accused of child abuse. I am risk averse in the
extreme when it comes to my daughters' welfare. But not hiring the baby-sitter on
account of his history is different from convicting the sitter of child abuse on
account of that history. I very much want to believe that I would not be moved to
convict the sitter just because he has been accused of child abuse. But I am unsure
whether the accusation would not tilt me against the sitter in a way that might
prevent me from viewing all of the evidence with the detachment and consideration
to which the sitter would be entitled were he on trial for the crime of child abuse.
Miguel A. Mendez, Character Evidence Reconsidered: "People Do Not Seem To Be Predictable
Characters," 49 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 873 (1998).
9. Acknowledging the weight of such evidence, Richard J. Sanders points out that:
The problem with propensity evidence is not a lack of logical relevance... Rather,
such evidence is excluded because it is not legally relevant. There are two problems
here: 1) Inferring propensity from acts, or acts from propensity, is a weak logic; and
2) focusing on the prior acts may lead to verdicts based on improper considerations.
To be admitted properly, similar fact evidence must be logically relevant to a
material issue by proving something other than propensity. It is not enough to ask
simply if the proffered evidence is relevant; the answer invariably will be yes.
Propensity evidence is always logically relevant to prove a material issue. This is
because propensity is not, in itself, a material issue; it is an intermediate inference in
a chain of inferences between the proffered evidence and the ultimate material issue.
We prove propensity in order to circumstantially prove conduct on a particular
occasion. In a given case, this can always S~e phrased in terms of a material issue:
Propensity can be logically relevant to prove the defendant committed the charged
offense ("identity"); that he acted with criminal intent and not in good faith or
mistakenly; or any number of other ultimate material issues.
Richard J. Sanders, "A Dangerous Bend in an Ancient Road": The Use of Similar Fact Evidence
for Corroboration, 74 FLA. BAR J. 40, 40 (2000) (footnotes omitted). Sanders goes on to explain
that propensity evidence used to establish any link in the logical connection between the similar
act and the material fact is traditionally inadmissible. Id.
10. For an example of how the prejudice resulting from propensity evidence can run
alongside racial prejudice, see Peek v. State, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986).
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These problems are even more pronounced in cases of child sexual
battery. We say that prior acts of abuse in such cases are logically rele-
vant, perhaps too relevant, to the question of a defendant's guilt in a
charged act. We mean these acts are so aberrant from what people con-
sider to be "normal human behavior" that knowing a defendant commit-
ted one or more such acts in the past leads us, at the very least, to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he did not commit the
charged act. This is why evidence of prior acts of child sexual battery
can so easily be more prejudicial than probative. The information can
only be probative if it increases the likelihood that the defendant actually
committed this particular act, but its evidentiary value, at best, goes to
the likelihood that the defendant will commit some act at sometime.
The persuasive effect, however, is stronger than the weight of the
logic." The severity of the crime convinces us to draw conclusions
before we have any actual knowledge that the defendant committed the
charged act and, thus, to begin from the position that the defendant is
guilty until proven innocent.'
2
Furthermore, this power is out of all proportion to the statistical
evidence. Even if we were to concede a jury might reasonably infer
some degree of a likelihood of guilt from those statistics, the admission
of prior acts in these cases would be unjustified since we cannot say at
what point statistical probability might equal evidence of guilt. If, for
instance, we knew that forty-nine percent of child molesters were recidi-
vists, it would be more likely than not, by the numbers alone, that our
charged child molester was not a recidivist. Yet, if we knew that fifty-
one percent of child molesters were recidivists, then it would be more
likely than not that our charged child molester repeated his earlier crime.
What percentage would it take then to make us feel justified in admitting
this evidence? In one article, Thomas J. Reed claims "[r]ecent empirical
evidence on sex offenders' recidivism rates that includes estimation of
11. The syllogism would run something like this: major premise-child molesters repeat their
crimes; minor premise-the defendant is a child molester; conclusion: the defendant repeats his
crime. It does not logically specify that the defendant has committed this particular crime. To
begin with the proposition that where a defendant has previously committed child molestation it is
more likely he has committed the act charged is to beg the question.
12. Perhaps the factor that most induces jurors to overestimate the probative value of
character evidence is what psychologists term the "halo effect." In the present
context it might be more aptly called the "devil's horns effect." The term refers to
the propensity of people to judge others on the basis of one outstanding "good" or
"bad" quality. This propensity may stem from a tendency to overestimate the unity
of personality-to see others as consistent, simple beings whose behavior in a given
situation is readily predictable.
Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352




undetected recidivism shows that exhibitionists, pedophiles, and adoles-
cent child abusers may have a fifty-percent recidivism rate for sex
offenses .... -13 This sounds convincing, but in practice it would mean
that if we were to convict on that statistic alone, we would be wrong half
the time. Are we willing to be wrong this often? Reed also tells us,
"The national recidivism rate for rearrest within three years for all types
of serious crimes hovers around sixty-five percent."' 4 So, even taking
into account estimates of unreported recidivism by exhibitionists,
pedophiles, and adolescent child abusers, their recidivism rate is actually
below that of the average serious criminal.
Still, whatever the statistical entanglements, proponents of allowing
propensity evidence argue that child molesters do have a propensity to
molest children and that prior acts have a special relevance to this crime.
They argue that a "lustful disposition" exception is necessary in cases
where a child accuses an adult of sexual battery and the credibility of the
child witness is at issue. While such views are well intentioned, they
forget that propensity therefore can be strongly argued in the cases of
many different crimes (drug offenses, acts of violence, prostitution, etc.).
Admission of evidence for the purpose of child sexual batteries could be
a very slippery slope indeed.
The best argument, though, for treating child sexual battery differ-
ently from other serious crimes with regard to propensity evidence is not
the condition of the accused, but of the accuser. Children are both the
most vulnerable members of society and the least able to articulate
effectively the wrongs that have been done to them. Any proposal for
loosening or restricting admissibility of evidence in these cases cannot
avoid taking into account the special condition of children as
complainants.
C. Prior Acts and Corroboration
1. THE WILLIAMS RULE
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Florida clarified and restated its rule
on the admissibility of similar fact evidence in Williams v. State.15 The
appellant had been convicted of rape and sentenced to death. He had
hidden in the back of his victim's car, stabbed her with an ice pick, and
sexually assaulted her twice before letting her go. At trial, Williams
13. Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence
in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 154 (1993). Reed states, "Clinical reports on child
sexual abuse show that offenders who sexually abused teenagers had a large number of similar
incidents that went unreported and unpunished, suggesting that such offenders have a true
recidivism rate above fifty percent, similar to the recidivism rate for violent offenders." Id. at 153.
14. Id. at 155 (citation omitted).
15. 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
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argued that the sex had been consensual and that he and the complainant
knew each other, but at the time of arrest, he had told a deputy sheriff
that he had mistaken the victim's car for his brother's and had crawled
in the back to take a nap. The prosecution introduced testimony from
two witnesses that six weeks earlier Williams had been caught in the
back of another young woman's unattended car. When caught that time
Williams also claimed that he had mistaken the car for his brother's.
The cars were of different makes and colors. Williams argued that the
testimony related to the prior act should have been excluded because it
was irrelevant to whether he had committed the rape in question.16 The
Florida Supreme Court upheld his conviction, stating:
In the immediate case at bar we think the evidence regarding the
[prior act] was clearly admissible because it was relevant to several
of the issues involved. It definitely had probative value to establish a
plan, scheme or design. It was relevant to meet the anticipated
defense of consent. At the time when it was offered in the presenta-
tion of the State's main case it had a substantial degree of relevance
in order to identify the accused. Finally, it was relevant because it
demonstrated a plan or pattern followed by the accused in committing
the type of crime laid in the indictment. In view of our analysis of
the precedents and for the future guidance of the bench and bar, the
rule which we have applied in affirming this conviction simply is that
evidence of any facts relevant to a material fact in issue except where
the sole relevancy is character or propensity of the accused is admis-
sible unless precluded by some specific exception or rule of exclu-
sion. This rule we hold applies to relevant similar fact evidence
illustrated by that in the case at bar even though it points to the com-
mission of another crime. The matter of relevancy should be care-
fully and cautiously considered by the trial judge. However, when
found relevant within the limits of the stated rule, such evidence
should be permitted to go to the jury.' 7
Both Florida's Williams rule and its codification, section
90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, admit similar act evidence when it is rel-
evant to prove a material fact in issue, but not when it is relevant solely
to prove bad character or propensity.' 8 The Florida legislature in section
90.404(2)(a) gives a non-conclusive list of material facts to which such
evidence could be relevant: proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepa-
16. Id. at 654-56.
17. Id., at 663.
18. Id. at 663. Professor Ehrhardt finds this use of the term "similar fact evidence"
misleading since the evidentiary act does not have to be similar to be admitted; it has to be
relevant. Similarity is a function of relevance rather than the other way around, CHARLES W.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 404.9 (2000).
[Vol. 55:619
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ration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 19
To be admitted under the rule, however, a prior act must meet what has
come to be known as a "strikingly similar" standard. As the Florida
Supreme Court later explained, "To be admissible under the Williams
rule, the identifiable points of similarity must pervade the compared fac-
tual situations, and, if sufficient factual similarity exists, the facts must
have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the
defendant."
20
2. BOLSTERING THE TESTIMONY OF A CHILD COMPLAINANT
In cases of child sexual battery within a familial or custodial con-
text where the defendant is known by the child and denies the charges,
none of Williams rule material facts are usually in dispute at trial.21 If a
child complainant were to have alleged molestation by a stranger, then
identity might be a central issue, and similar acts by the defendant would
be admitted because they would be relevant to whether the defendant
and the perpetrator were the same person.
Within a familial or custodial context, however, the identification
of the defendant as the perpetrator is not the real issue nor is the perpe-
trator's intent or knowledge an issue as it would be were charged, for
instance, with possession of stolen goods. Similarly, the defendant's
state of mind is not an issue in a sexual battery charge.22 Rather, in this
type of child sexual battery the issue upon which the case turns is
whether or not the charged act took place. Is the child fabricating his or
her testimony? To respond to this situation, the Florida Supreme Court
enlarged the list of purposes for which similar fact testimony could be
admitted, initially to include admission of similar fact evidence to cor-
19. The list is not limited to the specifically enumerated instances.
20. Thompson v. State, 494 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 1986).
21. But see, State v. O'Brien, 633 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (court excluded evidence of
similar acts because it defined the material issue as opportunity, which the similar act evidence as
admitted at trial would not support without unduly prejudicing the jury).
22. In Coler v. State, the Florida Supreme Court explained:
To be relevant, evidence must prove or tend to prove a fact in issue. The state
argues that the objected-to evidence proves Coler's state of mind. Coler's state of
mind, however, was not an issue. State of mind is not a material fact in a sexual
battery charge, nor is intent an issue. Cf Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960)
(specific intent is not the essence of the crime of rape).
418 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 1982) (citation omitted). But see Sampson v. State, 541 So. 2d 733, 735
(Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (holding similar fact evidence admissible where defendant argued he was in
stepdaughter's bedroom for innocent purposes and wife was mistaken in her assumptions). In
State v. Paille, similar fact evidence was admitted to prove a plan on the part of the defendant.
601 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The problem with admission of prior acts based on a
"pattern of criminality" is, that "the distinction between sexual design and sexual disposition is
often tenuous." Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. 1987). See also discussion of
Kimbrell infra, p. 2522.
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roborate testimony of a child sexual victim in a familial or custodial
context, and then later to corroborate a child sexual victim's testimony
in nonfamilial sexual battery cases where identity of the perpetrator is
not an issue.23
Evidence of prior or collateral acts can bolster the testimony of a
complainant in two basic ways. The first is by creating the presumption
that the accused has a propensity or predisposition to commit the crime.
This would violate the traditional rationale for the ban on admitting pro-
pensity evidence. The second means is by proving an element or mate-
rial issue in the case. In Williams, for example, the issues were plan,
identity, and absence of mistake. The existence of the prior act was
relevant to establishing that the accused had been correctly identified as
the rapist, that his use of a similar plan on both occasions also made it
more likely that he was the guilty party, and that the prior act helped to
refute his explanation that he had mistaken the car for his brother's and
crawled in to take a nap. In other cases, prior acts can establish opportu-
nity, knowledge, intent, motive, or preparation. In child sexual battery
cases, however, as discussed earlier, these are not usually material.
There is a material issue, however, to which prior acts can be quite
relevant in child sexual abuse cases: the issue of whether the criminal
act, the actus reus, actually occurred. Prior or collateral acts can corrob-
orate a child complainant's testimony through the similarity of the
23. Saffor v. State, 660 So. 2d. 668, 671 (Fla. 1995). Also, for its corroboration rationale in
Heuring, the Florida Supreme Court drew upon what has become a well known law review
Comment by Robert N. Block. Block examined a number of cases from California and elsewhere
admitting similar fact evidence in sexual battery cases for the purpose of corroborating the
testimony of the complainant, the most important of which was People v. Kazee:
The admissibility of evidence of other sex offenses for purposes of corroboration
was formally recognized in the 1975 California court of appeal case, People v.
Kazee. In Kazee, the defendant was charged with seven counts of incest, allegedly
committed against his two daughters. Evidence was introduced showing that the
defendant previously had forced his victims' two stepsisters into having sexual
relations with him. Because of the established relationship between the parties
involved, identity was clearly not at issue in the case. In holding the evidence of
previous sex offenses admissible, the court opined that "the admissibility of similar
acts of sexual misconduct cannot be justified on any theory except as a permissible
attempt to buttress the credibility of the prosecuting witness against the inevitable
defense challenge." The court expressly recognized the corroborative purpose of
such evidence, acknowledging the truism that because the question of the parties'
credibility is inherently at issue in a sex crime prosecution, there will generally be a
need for corroboration. The determination of admissibility hinges on the source of
the corroborative evidence: The complaining witness is precluded from self-
corroboration; but evidence of the defendant's sexual misconduct, as attested by
other victims, may properly corroborate the complaining witness's testimony.
Robert N. Block, Defining Standards for Determining the Admissibility of Evidence of Other Sex
Offenses, 25 UCLA L. REV. 261, 285-86 (1977) (footnotes omitted) (citing People v. Kazee, 121
Cal. Rptr. 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)).
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charged and collateral acts. The charged act can be similar enough to
the collateral act to make it unlikely that the witness is fabricating the
testimony. 24 The basis for this exception to the traditional inadmissibil-
ity of prior acts may be viewed as an expansion of the "absence of mis-
take or accident" category by what Professor Imwinkelried refers to as
the "doctrine of chances." Professor Imwinkelried describes the doc-
trine of chances as follows:
[A]ssume that the defendant is charged with murdering his child.
The child in question died of suffocation ... [Tihe defendant claims
that the death was due to natural causes and accidental in character
... [B]oth English and American cases permit the prosecutor to intro-
duce evidence of similar deaths of other children in the defendant's
custody. Considered collectively, the aggregate number of incidents
makes it objectively improbable that all the deaths were accidental
... [T]he prosecutor has invoked the doctrine of chances . . . The
question is not whether the defendant is the type of person who...
murders his relatives. The question is whether it is objectively likely
that so many deaths could be attributable to natural causes.25
The greater the aggregate number of incidents, the less likely is the
chance of accident or coincidence, which is also the weakness of this
argument when it is applied to those child sexual battery cases where
one witness's testimony is only collaborated by one other's. Even under
these circumstances, however, in order to dispute the logic of the doc-
trine of chances, we would have to assume either that two different wit-
nesses fabricated stories that were similar in key respects, or that one
witness's testimony was contaminated by the other's. While such a situ-
ation is not impossible, its degree of improbability does offer some pro-
tection to the rights of the defendant. The witness's testimony is
corroborated not by the accused's assumed propensity to repeat his
crime, but rather by the similarity of the acts themselves.2 6 The Florida
Supreme Court's standard for the admissibility of prior acts in child sex-
24. For consideration of just how similar "similar" has to be, see the discussion of Saffor infra
Section II.B.4.
25. EDWARD J. LMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 4.01, at 4-5 (1984 &
1992 Supp.) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1340 (Ind. 1992).
26. Richard J. Sanders cautions that the logic that follows from the use of the doctrine of
chances to corroborate testimony is flawed:
[W]hile the uncharged allegations do corroborate the charged allegations, this
corroboration is only a side effect of admitting the evidence; it is not the basis for
admission. The evidence is admitted because it is objectively reasonable to
conclude (on a nonpropensity basis) that the charged allegations are true because it
is unlikely that more than one child would fabricate similar false allegations against
the same person.
Sanders, supra note 9, at 46 (footnotes omitted).
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ual battery cases that occur in a familial or custodial context relies on
this second means of corroboration.
D. Florida's Response
The federal courts are now governed by Rule 414(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which declares, "In a criminal case in which the
defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child molesta-
tion is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant."27 When it created this rule, Congress made a
choice to come down wholly on the side of admissibility, even of admit-
ting prior acts to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the crime,
whatever the risk to the judicial process or to the rights of the accused.28
Some commentators see this as a fundamental change occurring to the
American legal system. Thomas J. Reed explains:
A new kind of criminal trial process is evolving through manipulation
of the principles of evidence. The traditional model for Anglo-Amer-
ican criminal trials was accusatorial. The prosecution was obliged to
prove a specific charge under the accusatorial model, and the judge
and jury were equally obliged to acquit the defendant if the prosecu-
tion failed to prove the defendant committed a forbidden act on the
day charged in the indictment. If the prosecution proved the defen-
dant committed a similar act on another day, the defendant was
acquitted because of a fatal variance between indictment and proof.
Under the new dispensation, the prosecution is still required to indict
the defendant and elect a day and time for commission of the prohib-
ited act, but the prosecution may prove that the defendant is predis-
posed to commit that type of crime by proving the defendant
committed a similar bad act on another occasion.29
Reed, a proponent of the admission of character evidence, does not shy
away from pointing out its potential for misuse, reminding us that during
World War I courts suspended limitations on proof of bad moral charac-
ter in order to obtain convictions for sedition.3" These shifts in eviden-
tiary law merit our concern.
The Florida Supreme Court in its child molestation cases has tried
27. FED. R. EvID. 414(a).
28. The drafting of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 through 415 does not even make it clear
that admissibility depends on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. In other words, it is not clear from
the drafting that such evidence can be excluded, even if the defendant has been acquitted of the
prior acts being considered as evidence. See Margaret C. Livnah, Branding the Sexual Predator:
Constitutional Ramifications of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 Through 415, 44 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 169, 177 (1996).
29. Reed, supra note 13 at 160-61.
30. Id. at 162 n. 190.
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to chart a course avoiding both the extreme of admitting evidence of
other offenses regardless of their prejudicial effect, and the other
extreme of disallowing all evidence of collateral offenses that do not
meet the Williams "strikingly similar" standard and are not relevant to
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, or absence of mistake or accident.3" Although this course has not
been without its own complications and risks, which at their worst could
result in a child molester being set free to abuse other children, it is the
contention of this Comment that if the court has erred in this dilemma it
has erred on the side of protecting the integrity of the judicial process
and will ultimately be proven correct in its judgments.
In this effort to strike a balance between the rights of the accused
and the practical difficulties in prosecuting a crime where often the only
evidence is the testimony of a child, the Florida Supreme Court has cre-
ated an unusual exception to the ban on evidence of prior criminal acts
allowing the admission of this evidence when sexual battery against a
child in a familial or custodial setting is alleged and the prior and
charged acts share significant similarities so that the prior act cor-
roborates the testimony of the child complainant. Although the court
has never articulated a sufficient theoretical rationale for this particular
exception-since the logic of corroboration would apply to virtually any
crime and any complainant where there was a lack of physical evidence
or corroborating eyewitnesses-such a rationale can be expressed. It is
based, however, not on any increased reliability of the similar act evi-
dence in this setting but on the consequences to the child complainant
should the defendant be wrongly acquitted of sexual battery in a familial
or custodial context. The court is, in effect, willing to take a greater risk
that this information will prejudice a jury because a mistaken verdict
might send a child back into the custody of his or her abuser.
II. DISCUSSION OF CASES
A. Arizona and California
Although the lustful disposition exception found is in many states
and dates back to the nineteenth century in some cases, 2 California and
Arizona both recently amended their laws to broaden rules for admissi-
31. These are the categories of both the Williams rule and its codification, section
90.404(2)(a). See infra at 6.
32. L. Renee Lieux, The Michigan Pig Farm Perception: The Michigan Supreme Court
Continues to Ignore the Opportunity to Create a Lustful Disposition Exception to Michigan Rule
of Evidence 404(b), 76 U. DEr. MERCY L. REv. 127, 151 (1998). Lieux lists twenty-one states as
either maintaining some form of a lustful disposition rule or in effect creating one. Florida is
included, I believe wrongfully, in this list.
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bility of prior acts. Following Congress's 1994 addition of Rules 413-
415 to the Federal Rules of Evidence, California in 1995 resolved a vac-
illation in its judicial history regarding admission of prior acts in sexual
battery cases by enacting section 1108 of the California Evidence Code,
which stated that in a criminal prosecution for a sexual offense other
sexual offenses could be admitted into evidence, and amended section
1101 of the California Evidence Code, its prohibition against character
evidence, to allow such evidence in sex crime cases. 33 The only limita-
tion was that the evidence must be more probative than prejudicial. In
People v. Soto, the Court of Appeal of California affirmed that this
broad rule of admission included "consideration of the other sexual
offenses as 6vidence of the defendant's disposition to commit such
crimes, and for its bearing on the probability or improbability that the
defendant has been falsely or mistakenly accused of such an offense. 34
The logic of section 1108 was that since only a small percentage of
human beings are willing to commit a sexual offense, evidence of prior
offenses is especially probative .3  Although this argument provided a
fig leaf for the California legislature, it was an extremely flimsy one.
Few of us are bank robbers, diamond smugglers, or even pickpockets,
but this does not make evidence of prior acts in those areas particularly
probative.
Arizona is even more forthright in embracing character evidence
for purposes of proving lustful disposition. Arizona Rule of Evidence
404(c) states:
In a criminal case in which a defendant is charged with having com-
mitted a sexual offense, or a civil case in which a claim is predicated
on a party's alleged commission of a sexual offense, evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted by the court if relevant
to show that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aber-
rant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged. In such a case,
evidence to rebut the proof of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, or an
inference therefrom, may also be admitted.36
Although, one commentator has claimed that Rule 404(c) is superior in
its drafting to its federal counterpart,3 7 the weakness of its reasoning is
even more apparent. It will admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
33. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (2000); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1101 (2000).
34. People v. Soto, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 605, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
35. Id.
36. ARIZ. R. EvID. 404(c).
37. Adam Kargman claims:
Through careful drafting, Arizona Rule 404(c) avoids many of the pitfalls of FRE
413 to 415, putting to rest such questions as whether judges need to conduct 403
balancing tests, whether judges must issue limiting instructions, and whether
defense counsel can introduce evidence to rebut other acts evidence. As a result, the
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acts (not even necessarily similar) specifically if they are relevant not to
establishing directly a propensity but to establish an unnamed character
trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity. There is evidence the
defendant committed a prior bad act that might show he is the kind of
person who might commit bad acts that might show that he is likely to
have committed this bad act because he might therefore have a sexual
propensity to commit this bad act. All this accomplishes is to add
another layer of mystification to a mystifying logic. The prior act is
admitted not to show that the defendant committed this act, but to show
that he had a personality that made him a candidate to commit this act.
B. The Florida Cases
1. HEURING
In Heuring v. State, the defendant, Frederick A. R. Heuring, had
been convicted of sexually battering of his stepdaughter when she was
between the ages of seven and twelve. The trial court admitted the testi-
mony of his older, natural daughter that he had also sexually battered
her, when she was between the ages of seven and fifteen, twenty years
before the charged incident.38 In addition, during cross-examination the
prosecution asked the defendant "whether he had molested five children
not at issue in the case,"39 and during a re-cross also improperly inter-
jected that these five children were going to testify that Heuring had
indeed molested them.40 Although vacating Heuring's conviction and
remanding for a new trial on the basis of this improper questioning, the
court held that the testimony of Heuring's older daughter was relevant
and properly admitted even though it was remote in time from the
charged act. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the lower court,
not only that the reliability of the testimony had not been affected by the
passage of time, but also that the absence of similar conduct on Heur-
ing's part during the twenty years between incidents only meant that the
opportunity to sexually batter young female children in his family
occurred generationally.4' Then, in response to Heuring's claim that the
evidence of the earlier crime was not proper Williams rule evidence, the
Heuring court first opened the door to the use of a defendant's prior acts
to corroborate the testimony of a child complainant who alleged sexual
Arizona rule poses much less of a hazard to the truth-seeking function of criminal
trials.
Adam Kargman, Three Maelstroms and One Tweak: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 to 415 and
Their Arizona Counterpart, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 986 (1999) (citations omitted).
38. Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122, 123-24 (Fla. 1987).
39. Id. at 125.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 123-24.
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abuse in a familial setting.42
The court began by analyzing the criteria for Williams rule evi-
dence: "To minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction, the similar fact
evidence must meet a strict standard of relevance. The charged and col-
lateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also
share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which
sets them apart from other offenses. ' 43 The similarity between the
charged and collateral offenses must reach a kind of critical mass where
the likeness of the two cannot but give rise to the inference that the
crimes were committed by the same person. The likeness requirement
of the Williams rule is met by the virtually undeniable similarities
between the charged and collateral acts, a so-called fingerprint, although
the fingerprint might be achieved by a combination of factors rather than
a single unique detail.44 Furthermore, the court explained, the require-
ments of section 90.404(2)(a) must be met, the "the evidence must be
relevant to a material fact in issue such as identity, intent, motive, oppor-
tunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident. '45 The court
then proceeded to create another category of relevance with a more
relaxed standard for admitting similar fact evidence:
Cases involving sexual battery committed within the familial context
present special problems. The victim knows the perpetrator, e.g., a
parent, and identity is not an issue. The victim is typically the sole
eye witness and corroborative evidence is scant. Credibility becomes
the focal issue. In such cases, some courts have in effect relaxed the
strict standard normally applicable to similar fact evidence. These
courts have allowed evidence of a parent's sexual battery on another
family member as relevant to modus operandi, scheme, plan, or
design, even though the distinction between sexual design and sexual
disposition is often tenuous. We find that the better approach treats
similar fact evidence as simply relevant to corroborate the victim's
testimony, and recognizes that in such cases the evidence's probative
value outweighs its prejudicial effect.46
Unfortunately, the court in Heuring did not further explain its deci-
sion. Although wishing to avoid the tenuous distinction between sexual
design and sexual disposition-that is to say, the pretense that modus
operandi, scheme, plan, or design are relevant to show whether or not
the defendant committed the crime when what is actually being shown is
the defendant's propensity or disposition to commit the crime-the
42. Id. at 124-25.
43. Id. at 124.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 124-25.
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court did not make clear what its relaxation of the Williams rule entailed.
In cases of child sexual battery, was all similar fact evidence per se held
to be more probative than prejudicial?47 If not, then what standard was
to be applied? And, what was the meaning of "familial context"?
2. RA WLS
In State v. Rawls, the accused, Augustus J. Rawls, had been a
boarder with the complainant's family. The court addressed the issue of
what "familial context" means and explained that the determination of a
family relationship must be made on a case-by-case basis. While con-
sanguinity and affinity are strong indica of such a relationship they are
not necessary to it, and defendant and victim need not reside in the same
home.48 "The relationship must be one in which there is a recognizable
bond of trust with the defendant, similar to the bond that develops
between a child and her grandfather, uncle, or guardian."4 9 The court
also acknowledged that the relationship exists "[w]here an individual
legitimately exercises parental-type authority over a child or maintains
custody of a child on a regular basis."5 The Rawls court rejected the
prosecution's argument that Rawls's relationship with his victim was
familial because he was "essentially a boarder" (paying rent and buying
his own food), "did not exercise any custodial or supervisory authority"
over the victim, and there was "no evidence that [the victim] looked
upon Rawls as a member of the family."'" The court, however, agreed
that the testimony provided by Rawls's previous victims was rightly
admitted, both under the traditional Williams rule standard of "strikingly
similar" conduct and because it could corroborate the testimony of a
child complainant where the issue was the credibility of the victim.5"
Rawls's method of securing and molesting his victims was the
same in each case: first he would befriend the boys' mothers, persuade
them to let him move in to the home as a boarder, give gifts such as
clothes, toys or money, then molest the boys when alone with them, and
47. The court does make it clear in Sexton v. State that even after determining that similar fact
evidence is relevant, this evidence is still subject to the restriction imposed by section 90.403.
FLA. STAT. § 90.403 states: "Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the
jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The court goes on, however, to emphasize
that the statute's use of the term "substantially outweighed." Sexton v. State, 697 So. 2d 833, 837
(Fla. 1997).




52. Id. at 1353.
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finally instruct them not to tell anybody. 3 The charged act, capital sex-
ual battery, was committed against M.R., a male child during the ten
days that Rawls lived with M.R.'s family. Rawls had convinced M.R.'s
mother to let him move in, telling her that he wanted "to live with a
family with children" and agreeing to provide his own food and to pay
rent. When M.R. and Rawls were alone, "Rawls touched M.R.'s penis
and placed it in his mouth. '54 This same pattern was repeated in the
evidence of three other boys who corroborated M.R.'s testimony. J.F.,
at eight or nine-years-old, had been molested by Rawls while Rawls
boarded with his family over a period of several years. Rawls gave J.F.
gifts and money and took him fishing. When no one else was present,
Rawls molested J.F. by putting his mouth on J.F.'s penis and told J.F.
not to tell anybody about what Rawls did to him. J.F.'s older brother,
J.K.F., testified that he too had been molested by Rawls in the same way
beginning when he was also eight or nine-years-old. Finally, T.S., nine-
years-old at the time he had been molested in the same manner, testified
that Rawls lived with his family as a boarder for somewhere between a
year and a year and a half, helping the family with groceries and buying
T.S. clothes and drinks. The molestations occurred when the two were
alone, and just as he had with the other boys, Rawls instructed T.S. not
to tell anyone. The court held, "Clearly the charged and collateral
offenses committed by Rawls share the unique combination of charac-
teristics required to meet the strict standards of the Williams rule. '56
Although Rawls is thought to have expanded Heuring to include "a
child sexual abuse victim's testimony in nonfamilial sexual battery cases
where the identity of the perpetrator is not an issue, ' 57 it left unclear
whether the standard for admission of such testimony should be the
"strikingly similar" standard or the "relaxed" standard. Rawls's particu-
lar crimes followed a fingerprint-like, distinct pattern, making the deci-
sion somewhat easy, but the court did not comment on cases that were
not so straightforward. 58
53. Id. at 1353-54.
54. Id. at 1351.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1354.
57. EHRHARDT, supra note 17, § 404.18, at 214.
58. This issue is still a problem. See Farrill v. State, 759 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000),
where the defendant was known to the complainant, but the incident was not committed in a
familial context. The appellate court refused to allow the relaxed standard. If the standard is to be
relaxed because the identity of the defendant is not the issue, but rather the credibility of the
complainant, a stronger rationale than simply our special abhorrence for familial or custodial child




On the same day that the court decided Rawls, it also decided
Hallberg v. State.59 James Hallberg was a junior high school history
teacher who over the course of a summer had sexually abused a child,
S.S., Hallberg's pupil during the school year. The incidents took place
during Hallberg's visits to S.S.'s home at times when her parents were
not present, under the guise of preparing her for the upcoming school
year. His visits were not scheduled with her parents' knowledge or con-
sent. The Hallberg majority summarized the abuse as follows:
S.S. testified that Hallberg came to her house seven to ten times that
summer and that on those occasions he fondled her breasts each time
and fondled and penetrated her vaginal area with his fingers on all but
the first visit. S.S. testified that on the last visit that summer Hallberg
forced her to perform oral sex on him after which he then performed




The issue raised on appeal was whether Hallberg was in a position
of familial or custodial authority, which would have made him subject to
section 794.041, Florida Statutes, which covered sexual abuse commit-
ted within a familial or custodial context. 62 The Florida Supreme Court
held that because the events occurred during the summer and did not
take place on school property, Hallberg was not in a position of custo-
dial authority.63 For Justice Shaw, in his dissent, section 794.041 was
"intended to protect Florida's children from those to whom they are
most vulnerable. 64 What counted was the position of trust Hallberg
held in the mind of his victim. The majority, however, defined "custo-
dial" more strictly as implying that the person in custody has "some
responsibilities in loco parentis. 65 Just as Rawls narrowly defined
familial context, Hallberg narrowly defined custodial context. Had
Rawls been the live-in boyfriend of his victim's mothers, however, or
59. 649 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1994).
60. Id. at 1356.
61. Id. at 1358.
62. In addition to his conviction for five counts of committing lewd acts upon a child,
Hallberg had been convicted of three counts of engaging a child in sexual activity by a person in a
position of familial or custodial authority. These last three counts carried a sentence of twenty-
seven years each, running concurrently.
63. Not to have so held might have left the schools with a potential civil liability for the acts
of their employees during times and in places totally removed from the circumstances of the
employment.
64. Hallberg, 649 So. 2d at 1361.
65. Id. at 1357.
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had Hallberg been teaching his victim in summer school, the outcome of
these cases would likely have been different.
4. SAFFOR
The Florida Supreme Court's most comprehensive attempt so far to
address the standard of admissibility of collateral crime evidence came
in Saffor v. State.66 Ramon Saffor had been convicted for sexual battery
of the ten-year-old son of his girlfriend. Both the child and his mother
were living with Saffor at the time of the attack, and Saffor and the boy
slept in the same bed during this period. The child testified that Saffor
woke him up, pulled down his pants, and sodomized him. Four years
prior to this incident, Saffor had been convicted of attempted lewd
assault on his twelve-year-old niece. In that instance, he had entered the
bedroom in which she was sleeping at her aunt's house and "put his
hands under her pajamas towards her vagina. ' 67 She apparently woke
up and told him to leave, which he did. The trial court admitted the
niece's testimony about the prior act.68 Saffor appealed, arguing that the
collateral crime of attempted lewd assault on his niece was not suffi-
ciently similar to the charged crime to be admitted under section
90.404(2). The question, then, certified to the court in Saffor was,
"What Is The Correct Standard To Be Utilized In Determining The
Admissibility Of Collateral Crimes Evidence In Cases Involving Sexual
Battery Within The Familial Context?
'69
After determining that the sexual battery did in fact take place in a
familial context, the court acknowledged that Heuring had not addressed
the issue of how similar the charged offense and the collateral sex crime
must be to prove admissible. It proceeded to examine and to reject two
opposing positions, one that would apply the same stringent similarity
requirements to sexual abuse occurring to children within the familial
context as are required by the Williams rule for other crimes, and one
that would require for admissibility merely that both crimes be commit-
ted in the familial context, even if all other aspects should be dissimilar.
Instead of either of these two positions, the court held:
that when the collateral sex crime and the charged offense both occur
in the familial context, this constitutes a significant similarity for pur-
poses of the Williams rule, but that these facts, standing alone, are
insufficient to authorize admission of the collateral sex crime evi-
dence. There must be some additional showing of similarity in order
for the collateral sex crime evidence to be admissible. The additional
66. 660 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1995).
67. Id. at 669.
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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showing of similarity will vary depending on the facts of the case and
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.7"
The application of this holding to Saffor's case resulted in his conviction
being quashed and the case remanded for a new trial. The two offenses
did not resemble each other closely enough to constitute the necessary,
additional showing of similarity.7'
5. WHERE WE ARE Now
In Saffor, the court firmly rejected the use of collateral sex crime
evidence to corroborate a victim's testimony by using that collateral evi-
dence to demonstrate "a depraved sexual propensity on the part of the
accused."72 The method of corroboration chosen by the court was a
comparison of the acts themselves. The court, however, refused to draw
a bright line regarding exactly how similar the alleged act and the prior
act must be to prove admissible. Were the prior acts to be considered
under the Williams rule, without the benefit of Heuring, then the "strik-
ingly similar" standard would have to be applied.73 The prior act would
have to be so distinctive as to constitute a fingerprint that matches the
fingerprint of the charged act. Heuring's innovation was to lower the
standard of distinctiveness for the relationship between the prior act and
the charged act when they occurred to children in a familial context. In
such a setting, as we have already seen, the issue is not the perpetrator's
identity, but rather the credibility of the complainant. A familial or cus-
todial context provides a beginning upon which to build an argument for
admission of similar fact evidence, but some distinctive link between the
charged and collateral acts is still needed. For that link to be made, the
details of the prior act only have to be close enough to the details of the
act charged to make it unlikely that the child's testimony is fabricated.74
70. Id. at 672.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. One commentator argues that the stringent similarity standards of Williams do still apply
as a result of Saffor:
Though it might not be regarded as absolutely clear, what [the Saffor court's holding
that the familial context constitutes a significant similarity but that an additional
showing is still necessary] seems to mean is that the stringent similarity requirement
associated with Williams does, as a matter of strict theory, apply. However, the fact
that both offenses are alleged to have occurred in a familial context is deemed to
supply, so to speak, a proportion of that similarity. What remains unclear is how
great a proportion is supplied thereby and, therefore, what level of similarity the
charged and collateral crimes must demonstrate.
Peter Mirfield, Similar Fact Evidence of Child Sexual Abuse in English, United States, and
Florida Law: A Comparative Study, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 30 (1996) (footnote omitted).
74. Justice Anstead argued for a stricter analysis in his concurrence to Saffor and quoted
Judge Allen's dissent below:
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This will be different in different circumstances, which is why the Saffor
court opted for settling the precise standard on a case-by-case basis.
This standard, though avoiding propensity, comes with its own set
of problems. First, if the testimony proffered as to both the prior act and
the latter act arise from the same family setting, it may be contaminated
by contact between the witnesses, so that a higher standard for such
testimony might be just as reasonable as a lower standard. Second, the
court offered no evidence that child molesters tend to follow a modus
operandi sufficient to create the similarities necessary for even the lower
Heuring standard. And, third, since sexual batteries may tend to be sim-
ilar anyway, which are the decisive factors of the offense for gauging
sufficient similarity?
The Saffor majority found that differences in the children's ages
and genders, in the time frames of the acts, in the locations where they
occurred, and in the times of day the acts occurred, were enough to
exclude the prior act. However, the dissent by Justice Shaw, author of
the majority decision in Heuring, found "numerous points of similarity,"
Where collateral crime evidence goes beyond merely showing that a defendant in a
familial child sexual assault case has committed a sexual assault upon another child
family member and additionally shows that the circumstances of the collateral crime
share a unique characteristic or set of characteristics With the charged crime, the
evidence serves to prove more than mere propensity. Such evidence bolsters the
credibility of the child witness in the charged crime, not because the evidence
simply shows the defendant's propensity to commit sexual assaults upon children,
but because it is unlikely that the victim in the charged crime could have fabricated
a version of the events which shares unique characteristics with the collateral
crime.
Saffor v. State, 625 So. 2d 31, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (emphasis in original); see also infra p.
2509 for a discussion of the doctrine of chances.
75. In some ways, this is not an improvement upon Heuring, only an elaboration. The
Heuring court took its similarity rationale from a California Supreme Court case, People v.
Haston, which it quoted:
[Ilt is apparent that the indicated inference does not arise... from the mere fact that
the charged and uncharged offenses share certain marks of similarity, for it may be
that the marks in question are of such common occurrence that they are shared not
only by the charged crime and defendant's prior offenses, but also by numerous
other crimes committed by persons other than the defendant. On the other hand, the
inference need not depend upon one or more unique or nearly unique features
common to the charged and uncharged offenses, for features of substantial but lesser
distinctiveness, although insufficient to raise the inference if considered separately,
may yield a distinctive combination if considered together. Thus it may be said that
the inference of identity arises when the marks common to the charged and
uncharged offenses, considered singly or in combination, logically operate to set the
charged and uncharged offenses apart from other crimes of the same general variety
and, in so doing, tend to suggest that the perpetrator of the uncharged offenses was
the perpetrator of the charged offenses.
Heuring, 513 So. 2d at 124 (quoting People v. Haston, 444 P.2d 91, 99-100 (Cal. 1968)).
Unfortunately, this standard smacks of "I know it when I see it" subjectivity.
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specifically that the children involved were distant relatives of the
accused, not members of his immediate family, the children were close
in chronological age, similar in biological development, were each
molested in the home, in bed while sleeping, were each asleep for the
night, and in both crimes Saffor performed the act upon the child rather
than forcing the child to perform a sexual act upon him, the sexual act
involving in both cases only the anal-genital region of the child.76 It is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that if we look hard enough we can
always find some elements of similarity in all sexual abuse cases. There
is still no clear guidance on which factors should count most."
These problems aside, the Saffor standard may yet prove to be a
workable solution. In two recent cases, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal came to its conclusions by carefully applying that standard. In
Thompson v. State, the defendant's conviction for sexual battery on a
child and sexual battery while standing in the position of a parent or
custodian was affirmed by the appellate court.78 Thompson had been
accused of engaging in oral and vaginal sex with his young daughter,
and the trial court had admitted collateral evidence that he previously
pled guilty to a lewd and lascivious assault upon his step-daughter while
she was between the ages of six and eleven. Thompson had sought to
exclude evidence of the collateral crime on the grounds that it, unlike the
charged attack, did not include oral or vaginal sex. The court found that
the similarity of Thompson's method of approaching his victims, of the
location of the incidents, and of the particular threats he made to prevent
disclosure, as well as the escalation of his advances, beginning with
kissing and fondling and progressing to oral sex, met the requirements of
Saffor.7 9 In the collateral crime, the defendant's step-daughter had
refused to acquiesce to oral sex, despite Thompson's request. The court
held:
In the instant case, we do not think the fortitude of the collateral
victim in resisting appellant should somehow make the crimes dis-
similar so as to prevent the admission of the testimony of these collat-
eral acts in appellant's trial. Therefore, we conclude that the crimes
are indeed very similar, and there was no error in the admission of the
76. Since the collateral act in Saffor was one for which Saffor was convicted four years
previously, presumably without evidence of prior acts, perhaps we should not jump so readily to
the conclusion that children are not capable of giving persuasive testimony without the
reinforcement of prior-act evidence.
77. The factors chosen by courts to analyze vary considerably. Compare, as Judge
Altenbemd suggests in his concurrence to Farrill, Shipman v. State, 668 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1996) with Moore v. State, 659 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), and Farrill, 759 So. 2d 702.
78. 743 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
79. Id. at 608.
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collateral crime testimony. 80
On the other hand, in Smith v. State the defendant's conviction was
reversed and remanded by the appellate court because the collateral evi-
dence presented at trial was found not to possess sufficient similarity to
the charged incident to corroborate the testimony of the victim.81
Whereas the victim in the charged crime-committing a lewd, lascivi-
ous, or indecent act upon a child under the age of sixteen years-was the
eight-year-old granddaughter of Richard Smith's girlfriend, the alleged
collateral acts were sexual assaults against his two daughters some years
earlier.82 Although both sets of incidents took place in a familial or
custodial context, the charged act was limited to touching the complain-
ant "in a bad way" by putting his hand under her pants and rubbing her
vagina when she and the defendant were alone in his bedroom and on a
fishing trip. The daughters' testimony involved far more extensive acts,
genital to genital contact, strip poker and sexual intercourse, and the
locations and modes of approach were quite different. Even though the
context of all the incidents was undisputedly familial, the Saffor stan-
dard was not met.
Although these cases are cause for optimism, there may still be
confusion, if not resistance, among the District Courts of Appeal in Flor-
ida as to what sorts of limitations exist on the use of similar fact evi-
dence. Recently, in Kimbrell v. State, an appellate court admitted a child
sexual battery complainant's self-corroborating testimony as to prior
similar acts, not for self-corroboration but to show "opportunity, prepa-
ration, and plan."83 The question of whether these were material facts in
issue in this particular case does not appear to have been part of the
court's consideration.8" Had the defendant raised these issues as a
defense, that he had no opportunity to commit the charged act or that
accident or mistake was involved, it would have been reasonable to
admit evidence to refute such a claim. The Kimbrell court, though,
gives no indication in its opinion that this was the case.85
80. Id.
81. 788 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2000).
82. Id. at 280-81. The incident with which Smith was charged had taken place eight years
before trial so that by the time of trial the victim was already sixteen years old. The charged act
was alleged to have taken place in 1992-1993, and the collateral acts between 1975 and 1986. The
appellate court did not, however, indicate whether the significant lapse of time between incidents
and testimony played any part in its decision.
83. 764 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
84. See Coler v. State, 418 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 1982). In that case, the court did perform an
analysis of the materiality of the reason given for admitting similar fact evidence.
85. It is striking that the court in this case was apparently unwilling to consider section
90.403, Florida Statutes, and weigh the potential for prejudice against the probative value of the
testimony. The potential for substantial prejudice resulting from similar fact testimony is made




It is possible that in Heuring the Florida Supreme Court may have
made exactly the right decision, but missed the opportunity to articulate
the best reason for making that decision. The question that underlies
whether to admit evidence of prior acts on a relaxed standard of similar-
ity when the acts occur in a familial or custodial context is why under
these circumstances such an admission would be more probative than
prejudicial. A lack of physical evidence and of corroborating eyewit-
nesses does not serve in and of itself to make such a case, as other
crimes where we would not wish to admit prior acts frequently share
these characteristics. The court's choice to utilize "the better approach"
of treating similar fact evidence in such circumstances as "simply rele-
vant to corroborate the victim's testimony"86 and not to elaborate as to
why this evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect
makes the decision appear vulnerable to a break down in reasoning: the
testimony is more probative than prejudicial because we need it to be.
This corroboration rationale has met with criticism, not only
because Florida is the only state to use it but also because, strictly speak-
ing, it is, as one handbook termed it, "theoretically unjustifiable."87 Evi-
dence of similar acts may frequently corroborate testimony. This does
not mean that such evidence should or would be admitted in other cir-
cumstances. The Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. O'Brien
questioned this logic of admitting similar acts for the purpose of
corroboration:
But even in cases not involving the familial context... and in non-
sexual crimes, corroborative evidence may be scant and credibility
may become the focal issue.
For example, in a single witness robbery by an acquaintance (so
that identity is not an issue), would it be appropriate to admit evi-
dence that the defendant committed other robberies only to corrobo-
rate the testimony of the witness?
Because this is such a heinous crime, harsh penalties are man-
dated and justified. There is broad agreement that no crime is more
show intent, preparation, plan, relationship between the victim and the offender, and existence of a
lustful state of mind toward the victim. Once again, see the court's perceptive remark in Heuring
that "the distinction between sexual design and sexual disposition is often tenuous." Heuring v.
State, 513 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. 1987); see also Toussaint v. State, 755 So.2d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA
2000) (testimony as to prior acts against the complainant in a child sexual battery case was also
admitted notwithstanding its self-corroborating nature). Although the Florida Supreme Court
refused to rehear Toussaint, it may eventually have to clarify its stance on the admissibility of
prior similar acts against the same victim.
86. Heuring, 513 So. 2d at 124-25.
87. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM & ROBERT S. GLAZIER, HANDBOOK OF FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 404.2
(1996).
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abhorrent than sexually abusing one's own child. That is precisely
the reason that a policy making it more likely that a wrongful convic-
tion may be obtained is surprising.88
O'Brien makes an important point, and intellectual honesty compels the
acknowledgment that the use of similar acts for the purpose of corrobo-
ration-a "more liberal standard of admissibility"-entails "a greater
willingness to risk a wrongful conviction. '"89
What then justifies this greater risk? It cannot merely be that the
particular crime is so abhorrent to us, or we will find ourselves unable to
answer the criticism voiced by Chief Judge Harris in O'Brien. Perhaps,
the Florida Supreme Court in Heuring did not consider, or at least did
not incorporate into its opinion, what constitutes the source of the differ-
ence between cases of child sexual battery within the family and other
crimes. If the defendant is wrongly acquitted, the victim may well-as a
result of action by the state and in conformity to the laws of the state-
be returned to the custody or control of his or her abuser. Although a
similar situation might exist in cases of domestic violence, there we are
more likely to have either physical evidence or to have a victim who is
at least legally capable of leaving the abusive situation. A child who has
been sexually abused by a family member wrongfully acquitted of the
act may have no legal option. This is admittedly a consequential argu-
ment. It does not make testimony as to prior acts per se any more proba-
tive. What it shows is why a particular exception to strict similarity is
justified. In other words, regarding cases of child sexual battery within a
familial or custodial context, the argument is not that testimony as to
prior acts is more probative in that particular context than in others,
merely that its potential for prejudicial effect carries less weight given
the state's responsibility for the child.
While it may be argued that if a serial killer or terrorist bomber is
wrongfully acquitted the consequences are horrific and might also jus-
tify loosening of the strict similarity standard, in those cases the veracity
of the complainant is not the primary focus of inquiry. In other types of
crime where the veracity of the complainant may be the focus, even a
sexual battery against an adult, a wrongful acquittal-again, however
terrible-would not result in the victim being returned to the legal cus-
tody or control of the rapist. Child sexual battery within a familial or
custodial context is different.9"
Although the Florida Supreme Court has articulated a position on
88. State v. O'Brien, 633 So. 2d 96, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
89. Id. at 99.
90. Although in a case where a child alleged physical (non-sexual) abuse against a family
member a veracity contest between complainant and defendant could certainly arise, we would at
least have the potential for increased physical evidence or for eyewitnesses.
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the admissibility of similar fact evidence in child sexual abuse cases that
does not depend on propensity and yet still serves to bolster the credibil-
ity of child sexual abuse victims, the court has not been able to articulate
why the familial or custodial context should be treated differently or to
give us a clear hierarchy of factors by which to gauge the similarities of
collateral evidence. How similar do prior acts have to be to become
relevant? Perhaps it is impossible to answer this question. Like Odys-
seus's passage between Scylla and Charybdis, perhaps there is no good
solution. Odysseus, after all, lost six of his sailors to his dilemma. The
court may simply have given us the best solution possible under the
circumstances, a careful navigation between extremes.
GEORGE FRANKLIN
